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IN THE SlJPREIVlE COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
}),\ Y & XH~IIT IIEATIXG CO:\I-
p AX Y, l.:\'T., a lTtah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
l'. :\1. RlTFF, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
XATCRE OF CASE 
Case No. 
10811 
This was an action brought under the provisions 
of Section 14-2-2, l'tah Code Annotated. Plaintiff-
appella11t alleged in its complaint that it furnished labor 
and materials under a contract with Reed S. Tew, a 
general contractor, for the construction of a home on 
property belonging to defendant-respondent and that 
the contractor failed to pay a balance of $930.00 due 
for said labor and materials. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VEH COCHT 
After answering the complaint, respondent tiled 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings. This motion 
was based on the ground that the pleadings showed 
on their face that appellant's action was barred by the 
provisions of said Section 14-2-:2. The motion was heard 
on December 7, 1966, pursuant to notice. Hespornlent 
filed a written memorandum in support of its motiol! 
and although appellant appeared by its counsel and 
argued the matter, it made no request to file a reply 
memorandum. After taking the matter under a<IYise-
ment, the lower court granted respondent's mc;tion 
and on December 8, 19(:)(), entered a judgment dismiss-
ing the action. 
RELIEF SOCGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent has not appealed and seeks affirmance 
of the judgment entered by the lower court. 
STATE)lENT OF FACTS 
Respondent admits that he is the owner of prop· 
erty described in the complaint and that Reed S. Tew. 
a contractor, who subsequently took out bankruptcy, 
constructed a home on the property for him. Respondent 
did not require a labor and materialman's bond from 
l\lr. Tew, but paid him in full for the job. Because he 
lacks sufficient information, respondent cannot admit, 
2 
h<m·eyer, that plaintiff furnished labor and materials 
for the construction of the home, toward which there 
1~ still a balance owing of $930.00, or that such sum 
is the reasonable value of any labor and materials fur-
nished to the property. Respondent recognizes that for 
the purposes of this appeal, the facts well-pleaded by 
appellant must be assumed to be true. 
STATE:\IEXT OF POINTS 
APPELLAXT HAD NO ~!ORE THAN ONE 
YEAH AFTER THE EFFECTIYE DATE OF 
THE A~IEXD~IEXT TO SECTION 14-2-2, 
C'L\II CODE AXNOTATED, IN 'YHICH TO 
BlUXG THIS ACTION. NOT HA YING DONE 
SO. THE ACTIOX IS BARRED AND THE 
LO\ YER COCHT PROPERLY SO RCLED. 
Hespondent does not quarrel with the cases and 
authorities cited by appellant in Point I of its brief. 
HoweYer, appellant's reliance upon them, under the 
circumstances of this case, is misplaced. They· are in-
applicable for several reasons. 
First, this case does not invoke a regular statute 
of limitations but rather what is often called a statute 
of creation or a "built-in" limitation. Second, Section 
U-2-2 need not be applied retroactiYely, as appellant 
argues, to bar this action. Third, there was no action 




Appellant argues that amendmeuts to statutes nf 
limitation should not be given retroactive affect unlcs, 
it affirmatively appears that such was the intention 
of the legislature. This may be true as a general rule. 
However, it is not generally true when the limitation 
is part of the statute creating the right itself. The 
distinction is pointed out in 34 Am. J ur., Limitation 
of Actions, §7 as follows: 
"A statute of limitations should he differen-
tiated from conditions which are annexed to a 
right of action created by statute. A statute 
which in itself creates a new liability. gives an 
action to enforce it unknown to the common 
law, and fixes the time within which that action 
may be commenced, is not a statute of limitations. 
It is a statute of creation, and the commence-
ment of the action within the time it fixes is an 
indispensible condition of the liability and of 
the action which it permits. The time element 
is an inherent element of the right so created. and 
the limitation of the remedv is a limitation of 
the right. Such a provision wfll control, no matter 
in what form the action is brought." 
That the rule regarding "retrospective application" 
is different under such statutes of creation is pointed 
out in 53 C.J.S., Limitation of Actions, §.J.(a) and (c), 
which state: 
(a) "\\There the cause of action involved is 
one created bv statute, and the time for com-
mencing the ~ction is a condition of liability, 
it is not a statute of limitations and will operate 
retrospectively if a contrary intention is not 
manifest. 
• • • 
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( c) "\Vhen the statute declares generally that 
no action, or no action of a certain class shall 
be brought, except within a c~rtain limited time 
after it shall have accrued, the language of the 
statute would naturally make it apply to past 
actions as well as to those arising in the future, 
and the fact that the statute makes no exception 
of existing causes of action raises a strong pre-
sumption that it intended to make none, al-
though this conclusion has also been emphatic-
ally denied." (.Emphasis added). 
The aboye rule was applied in Earle v. Frocdtcrt 
Groin & Jlaltin,r; Co., 85 P.:2d 264 (\Vash. 1939), which 
was an action by a state court receiver to recover an 
alleged preference. A statute, which became effective 
on June 10, 1931, provided that actions by receivers 
<1r trustees to recover preferences had to be commenced 
within six months from the time of the filing of the 
application for the appointment of the receiver or 
trustee. The application for the appointment of plai!1-
titf as receiver was made on August U, 1930. The 
Supreme Court of "r ashington, while acknowledging 
that generally statutes ought not to be construed to 
operate retrospectively in the absence of language in-
dicating such a legislative intent, distinguished between 
ordinary statutes of limitation and those included with-
in the right itself. In this connection it said: 
"The statute defining and allowing recovery 
for a preference creates a statutory, legal lia-
bility. subject to the limitation that a suit to 
t·nforce it must be commenced within six months 
from the time of filing the application for the 
5 
appointment of a trustee, etc. The limitation is 
not one that goes to the remedy of a defendant 
like the ordinary statute of limitation, but it 
goes to the cause of action or right to sue. The 
time prescribed-six months from the time 0 i· 
filing the application for appointment of the 
trustee for the commencement of the action-
is a condition to the enforcement of the liabilitv 
or the trustee's right of recovery, an elemer{t 
in the right itself. The right falls with the fail-
ure to commence the action within the allotted 
time. 
"'Ve believe the new statute of limitations pro-
vided for a reasonable time within which to com-
mence causes of action which accrued prior to 
its enactment. The six months' statute of limi-
tations, provided for by the statute before us. 
operates in futuro from June 10, 1931, governs 
with respect to respondent's pre-existing cause 
of action, limits it, and the full time allowed 
by the new statute within which to institute the 
action, became applicable to his cause of action. 
The limitation prescribed by the neu: statute 
commenced when the cause of action 'ltHL.'I .first 
subjected to the operation of the statute, that is, 
upon its effective date." (Emphasis added). 
See also, Morris v. Orcas Lime Co., 53 P.2d 604 
(Wash. 1936). 
In O'Dono,ghue v. State, 405 P.2d 258 (\Vash. 
1965), the State of 'Vashington enacted a statute pro-
viding that claims against the state for damages arising 
out of tortuous conduct had to be presented and filed 
with the state within 120 days from the date that the 
claim arose. Prior to the statute and at the time plain-
6 
tiffs' claim arose, the period was two years. Plaintiffs 
rnntended that to apply the 120 day limitation to them 
would deny them "a vested right by a retrospective 
application of the statute." The court said that this ar-
rrument was untenable and concluded: 
b 
"The legislature has prescribed the limitations 
and the manner in which suits must be brought. 
Claim statutes of the type involved here are 
mandatory and compliance with them is a con-
dition precedent to recovery (citing cases). 
''The fact that the legislature amends the pro-
cedure, or rather limits the time for filing suits, 
does not prejudice substantive rights of appel-
lants. Appellants not only had the benefit of a 
120-day period in which to file a claim with the 
state auditor but also had 29 days from the time 
the cause of action arose until the legislation 
became effective. Consequently, it is seen that 
no sense of this retrospective application of the 
law." 
In Earl JV. Baker & Co. v. Morris, 54 P.2d 353 
(Okla. 1935), a case wherein the legislature reduced 
the time within which the Oklahoma Industrial Com-
mission retained jurisdiction to re-open causes upon 
applications based upon changed conditions, stated: 
"Though not precisely in point, we think the 
reasoning here im·olved is substantially consis-
tent with the rule that 'where the cause of action 
i1woh-ed is created bv statute, and the time for 
commencing the acti~n is a condition of liability, 
it is not a statute of limitations and will operate 
retrospectively if a contrary intention is not 
manifest.' " 
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Appellant contends that the amendment to Section 
14-2-2 must be applied retrospectively in order to bar 
its action. Respondent submits that such is not the case. 
If appellant had brought this action within one year 
from the effective date of the amendment, but more 
than a year after furnishing the labor and materials, 
there might be a question of retrospective application. 
but it did not do so, and the court is not faced with 
the problem of determining what the result would be 
in such a situation. Or if it appeared that appellant 
was given a short and unreasonable length of time 
after the amendment in which to file its action, there 
might be a question of due process or legislative intent. 
But, in fact, under the rule adopted by most jurisdic-
tions, it had as much time to bring the action as any 
claimant whose rights arose concurrent with or sub-
sequent to the enactment of the amendment. 
The rule was stated in Hanford v. Kiny County, 
192 Pac. 1013 (\Vash. 1920) as follows: 
"The statute not being retroactive, to what ex-
tent does it apply to causes of action which had 
accrued at the time it became operative? U pnn 
this question, in Baer v. Choir, 7 "rash. 631, 32 
Pac. 776, 36 Pac. 286, the rule of the Pnited 
States Supreme Court (Sohn v. "r aterson, 17 
Wal. [U.S.} 596, 21 L. Ed 737) was adopted, 
which is to the effect that a new statute of limi-
tations takes effect upon the pre-existing rights 
of action and limits them, but in every such case 
the full time allowed by the new stah
0
1te is arnil-
able to the complainant; in other words, the 
limitation of the new statute as applied to pre-
8 
existing causes of action commences when the 
cause uf action i.s· first subjected to the operation 
of the statute unless the legislature has other-
wise provided." (Emphasis added). 
In O'Donor;hue v. State, supra., the "rashington 
Supreme Court stated: 
"'Ye have said that statutes affecting vested 
rights will be construed as operating prospec-
tively only (citing cases). That is exactly what 
is being done in this case. The appellant's time 
to file his claim ran from the effective date of 
this statute. The issue here is procedural or 
remedial rather than one affecting a substantive 
right." 
In 'Yood on Limitation of Actions, J.th Ed., p. 
59, it is said: 
"If before the statute bar has become com-
plete the statutory period is changed, and no 
mention is made of existing claims, it is generally 
held that the old law is not modified by the new 
so as to give to both statutes a proportionate 
effect, but that the time passed is effaced, and 
the new law governs; that is, the period pro-
vided by the new law must run upon all existing 
claims in order to constitute a bar. In other 
words, the statute in force at the time the action 
is brought controls unless the time limit by the 
old statute for commencing an action has elapsed, 
while the old statute was in force before the suit 
is brought, in which case the suit is barred." 
Oli1.H1s v. l'Veincr, 27 4 P.2d 476 (Cal. App. 2d 1954), 
was an action for malpractice based on defendant's 
attendance at plaintiff's birth 22 years before the action 
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was brought. A statute was amended about ten year~ 
after plaintiff's birth to provide that: 
"Any action by or on behalf of a minor for 
personal injuries sustained prior to or in the 
course of his birth must be brought within six 
years from the date of the birth of the minor." 
The plaintiff contended that to apply the limitation 
to his cause of action would constitute a retroactire 
application of the amendment, unwarranted in absence 
of legislative intent that it was meant to apply retro-
actively. In holding that the amendment applied to 
causes of action that had already accrued prior to its 
enactment the court said: 
"Plaintiff argues that the amendment operates 
retrospecticely because it starts the time running 
from the date of his birth, viz., December I, 
1931, and therefore purports to cut off his right 
of action immediately upon its passage; hence 
it is invalid as to him. Since, under most circum-
stances, such a result would be unconstitutional 
and in any event, harsh and unreasonable, 'It 
will be presumed that such is not the intent of 
the legislature,' Sohn v. 'Vaterson, 17 'Vall. 
596, 599, 21 L. Ed. 737. Statutes are presumed 
to operate prospectively. * * * This amend-
ment is no exception to such rule. Anyone ha\'ing 
a right of action under the statute had six years 
after the amendment become effective within 
which to file his complaint. A statute is not 
made retroactive merely because it drates upon 
facts existing prior to its enactment. Thus 
changes in procedural law have been held ap-
plicable to existing causes of action. The effect 
of such statutes is actuall.Y prospective in n~durc 
10 
since they relate to the procedure to be followed 
in the future. Xational Automobile & Cas. Ins. 
Co. v. Downey, 98 Cal. App.2d 58(}, 590, 220 
P.2d 962; Argues v. N" ational Superior Co., 67 
Cal. App.2d 7ti:3, 778, 155 P.2d fi43; Earle v. 
Froedtert Grain & :\Ialting Co., 197 'Vash. 341, 
85 P.2d 264." (Emplrnsis added.) 
Another case applying the same rule is Oklahoma 
I~'111plu,1;111cnt Security Commission v. Eddie, 154 P.2d 
ili:J (Oki. 1944). This was an action to recover em-
ployers' contributions which became due in 1936 and 
IU37. l 11 1941 the act allowing actions to recover con-
tributions was amended to provide that such actions 
must he eommenced within three years after the date 
on whieh the quarterly return was required to be filed. 
Prior thereto there was no limitation. The court, apply-
ing the a hon rule, said: 
"The l941 amendment fixing a limitation of 
three years for this character of action became 
effective :\Iav 16, 1941. At that time three years 
had already ~lapsed with respect to these c~uses 
of action. The amendment contains nothing to 
indicate a legislative intent to immediately bar 
claims with respect to which the three years 
had already run." 
"The rule governing such cases is clearly 
stated in )lagnolia Petroleum Company v. 'Vat-
kins. et al., 177 Oki. 30, 57 P.2d 622, 623. Para-
graph 2 of the syllabus thereto is as follows: 
'In construing a statute of limitations, it must, 
so far as it affects rights of action in existence 
when the statute is passed, be held, in the ab-
sence of a contrary provision, to begin when 
11 
the cause of action is first subjected to its op. 
eration." 
Another Oklahoma case to the same effect j, 
Sheffel 'l'. Cities Service Oil Co., 222 P.2d 1024 (Ok! 
1950). 
In 1Vare v. Heller, H8 P.2<l 410 (Cal. App.~d 
1944), amendments were made in 19:33 to a foreclosure 
stah1te. One amendment provided that: 
"Any such action (for deficiency judgment! 
must be brought within three months of the time 
of sale under such deed of trust or mortgage." 
The issue, as stated by the court, was whether tht 
three month statute of limitation applied to an action 
brought on a 1931 note. The court refused to gin 
retroactive effect to another amendment relating to 
fair market value, but held that the three month statute 
applied and said: 
"There is no inconsistency in holding that the 
fair-market value provisions of Section 580a 
are not applicable to an action brought on a 1931 
note, and in holding that the section's three 
months' statute of limitations is applicable. Pro-
visions such as those first ref erred to, which 
would place a limitation upon the amount that 
the holder of a note may receive, fall within the 
definition of retrospective statutes; they would 
affect a right which existed before the statute 
was passed. Rut a provision dealing with the 
period within which an action may be brought. 
so long as it does not reduce the time to such 
an extent that it amounts to a deprivation of 
an opportunity to enforce a pre-existing right, 
12 
is not 'retroactive' because it does not affect 
a right or obligation of the pre-existing contract. 
* * * procedural changes operate on existing 
causes of actions and defenses and it is a mis-
nomer to designate them as having retrospective 
effect." 
This court has previously given effect to the gen-
eral principles set forth above, in connection with a 
limitations case. In Silver King Coalition 1llines Co. v. 
J11d11strial Commission, 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P.2d 689 
1I954) , an amendment, extending the time after ex-
posure within which death benefits might be payable 
for the death of a miner dying of silicosis, was passed 
before the death of a miner but after he had left this 
employment. It was held that interpreting the amend-
ment to enable the widow to recover for the miner's 
death which occurred after expiration of the period 
prescribed by the statute in effect at the time of ex-
posure did not amount to giving the amendment a 
proscribed retroactive effect. The court therein stated: 
"A statute is not made retroactive merely be-
cause it draws on antecedent facts for its opera-
tion. (citing cases). A law is retrospective, in 
its legal sense, which takes away or impairs 
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or 
creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, 
or attaches a new disability in respect to trans-
actions or considerations already passed." 
The court concluded that a right could not be con-
sidered as vested unless it was something more than a 
mere expectation based upon an anticipated continua-
tion of present laws. 
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Further, the effect of amendments to statutes <JJ 
limitation was discussed in a separate opinion by .J ustict 
Larson in State J'(U' Commission v. Spani:·;h Fork, HU 
Ut. 177, 100 P.2d 575, wherein he stated: 
"An examination of the cases reHects gen-
erally the distinction that where the change 111 
the statute affects only the remedy, the legis-
lature may change the time or manner of en-
forcing a right or existing cause of action a~ 
long as it does not extinguish or wipe out an 
existing right. Parties to contracts Im ve no 
vested interest in particular limitation laws or 
methods of procedure for the enforcement of 
rights." 
None of the Utah cases cited by appellant are really 
germane to the problem invoked in the present case. 
They all deal with retroactive application of substan-
tive laws, not those of remedy or procedure, and some 
in fact recognize that procedural laws may be treate<l 
differently. The ~l crcur case ( 1ll crcur Gold 1lli11i11.r; &. 
illilling Co. ·r. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 52 Pac. 382). 
for example, dealt primarily with the question of 
whether a constitutional pro\'ision was self-executing. 
Holding that it was not, this court merely decided that 
a statute implementing the constitutional provision 
could not be applied to circumstances occurring prior 
to the passage of the statute. 
Archer 'l'. L'tah State Land Board, 1.5 Utah :.2d 
321, 392 Pac. 622, involved a situation where the State 
Land Board was given authority, after the original 
complaint was filed,to conduct hearings and enter orders 
14 
in connection with matters under its jurisdiction. The 
court rejected the contention that because of this statute 
the district court lost jurisdiction and said: 
"Ordinarily the facts and the law in a given 
lawsuit are to be applied as of the date of the 
filing of the original complaint." 
This case actually supports the position of respondent 
rather than appellant. 
I 11 re I ngraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P.2d 
:HO. inn1lYed an amended statute which provided that 
gifts to charitable organizations could be deducted in 
arriYing at the net taxable estate for inheritance tax 
purposes. The court, recognizing that there is a differ-
ence between procedural and substantive changes, found 
this was not merely a procedural enactment but one 
of substance. In arriving at its conclusion, the court 
noted that to apply the statute retroactiYely would 
place a premium on procrastination and said: 
"The law has always sought to award the 
diligent and refuse its approval of delay." 
In this case the appellant would have the court 
do just the opposite. 
The 11lcCarey case (b'lcCarey t•. State Teachers 
Retirement Board, Ill Utah 257, 177 P.2d 725) clearly 
inrnlves a situation where retroactive application of 
a statute would haYe impaired vested rights. 
The remaining authorities cited by appellant deal 
with pending actions. There is no doubt that a statute 
15 
of limitations would not be applied retroactiYe]y tu . 
• d 
case whid1 has been filed and is pending at the timt 
of its enactment, but such is not the case here. Thii 
action was not filed until oyer a year after the amend. 
ment took effect. 
CONCLUSION" 
The amendment limiting to one year the tirm 
within which Section 14-2-2 actions can be brought 
is not a regular statute of limitations, but a built-:u 
limitation. At the time appellant brought its action 
the only right it had to do was by Yirtue of Section 
14-2-2. Since the limitation was then part of the right, 
appellant was bound by it. \Yhere the right is ont 
created by statute and the time proYided therein for 
commencing the action is stated, such is not a statutt 
of limitations and will operate retrospecti,·ely unless 
a contrary intention is affirmatiYely shown. There i.' 
no question here of appellant being depriHd of an op-
portunity to bring its action for eyen giwn a retro-
spective application of the statute, it had eight month' 
after this statute was passed and ten months after it 
became effectiYe in which to bring its action. 
'Yithout giving the statute a retrospectiq appli-
cation, under the rule adopted hy most jurisdictions, 
appellant's action is barred. This rule prm·ides that the 
limitation prescribed by the new statute commenced 
when the cause of action was first subjected to the 
16 
I 
operation of the statute. Under such rule, appellant 
would haYe had until ~lay 11, 1966, in which to bring 
this action. However, it did not do so until September, 
J 91ili. Thus, the action is barred and the lower court 
properly granted respondent's motion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROE, JER~IAN & DART 
B. L. Dart, Jr. 
Ralph L. Jerman 
510 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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